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LOOKING BEYOND AMNESTY AND 
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
RECONCILIATION MECHANISMS IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA: A PROPOSAL FOR 
TRUTH-TELLING AND REPARATIONS 
Cecily Rose* 
Abstract: This article examines the role that amnesty and traditional prac-
tices play in fostering justice and reconciliation in northern Uganda. Al-
though the twenty-two year conflict involving the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in northern Uganda has only recently come to an end, many for-
mer LRA rebels have been returning returning for years to their commu-
nities after taking advantage of the amnesty offered by the government of 
Uganda. Consequently, reintegration, accountability, and reconciliation 
are currently prominent legal issues in northern Uganda. Literature on 
this subject, however, mainly touches upon how the amnesty process and 
the peace talks are in tension with the International Criminal Court’s 
pending arrest warrants for LRA leaders. This article, by contrast, argues 
that given the shortcomings of the amnesty process and the traditional 
practices, a truth commission and a reparations process could play a criti-
cal role in northern Uganda’s transition from conflict to peace. 
Introduction 
 After twenty-two years of conflict in northern Uganda, a movement 
toward reconciliation has begun, even though the Ugandan govern-
ment and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have only recently con-
cluded a peace deal. Although peace long eluded northern Uganda, 
literature on the subject has already begun to discuss how Uganda can 
foster long-term reconciliation.1 While negotiators struggle to achieve 
                                                                                                                      
* J.D., Columbia; B.A., Yale. Associate Legal Officer, Appeals Chamber, Special Court 
for Sierra Leone. Law Clerk to Judge Sepúlveda and Judge Shi, International Court of 
Justice, 2006–2007. Many thanks to Professor Francis Ssekandi for his guidance and en-
couragement and to Régine Gachoud, Rebecca Jenkin, Marko MilanoviG, Peter Prows, and 
Eleanor Wilkinson for their helpful comments. 
1 For literature discussing how Uganda might foster long term reconciliation, see Tim 
Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army 162−68 (2006) [hereinafter Trial Justice]; Tim Allen, War and Justice in North-
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peace, victims of the LRA struggle to forgive and reintegrate thousands 
of former LRA rebels who have returned to their communities from 
the bush after taking advantage of the amnesty granted by the govern-
ment of Uganda under the Amnesty Act of 2000.2 In this context of re-
integration, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aca-
demics, within and outside of Uganda, initially seized on the potential 
for traditional Acholi ceremonies and conflict resolution methods to 
play a role in northern Uganda.3 With the announcement that the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) would begin investigating the senior 
leaders of the LRA in 2004, intense speculation ensued about how the 
ICC’s role might conflict with peace negotiations and the traditional 
justice and reconciliation mechanisms.4 Uganda now faces the simulta-
neous operation of regional traditional ceremonies, a national amnesty 
process, and international criminal prosecutions.5 To this already com-
plex and controversial mixture of transitional mechanisms in Uganda, 
                                                                                                                      
ern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court’s Intervention 
(2005), available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/AllenICCReport.pdf 
[hereinafter War and Justice]; Citizens for Global Solutions, In Uncharted Waters: 
Seeking Justice Before the Atrocities Have Stopped 23 (2004), available at http://www. 
globalsolutions.org/files/general/uncharted_waters.pdf; Gilbert M. Khadiagala, The 
Role of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Peace Building in 
Northern Uganda, in The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling 
Violent Conflicts and Building Peace: A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater 
Horn of Africa, app. C, at 17 (2001); Liu Inst. for Global Issues & Gulu Dist. NGO 
Forum, Roco Wat I Acoli: Restoring Relations in Acholi-land: Traditional Ap-
proaches to Reintegration and Justice (2005) [hereinafter Roco Wat I Acoli]; Phuong 
Pham et al., Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Forgotten Voices: A Population-
Based Survey on Attitudes About Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda 16−17 
(2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/2/127.pdf; Barney Afako, Recon-
ciliation and Justice: ‘Mato Oput’ and the Amnesty Act, 11 Accord 64, 64−67 (2002); Lucy Hovil & 
Zachary Lomo, Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict 
Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation 7−8 (Refugee Law Project, Working Paper No. 15, 
2005), http://www.refugeelawproject.org/resources/papers/workingpapers/RLP.WP15.pdf. 
2 See Amnesty Act, 2000 (Uganda), available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/ 
northern-uganda/documents/2000_Jan_The_Amnesty_Act.doc. 
3 For literature seizing on the role for traditional Acholi ceremonies and conflict resolu-
tion methods, see Dennis Pain, Int’l Alert, The Bending of Spears 58−60 (1997); Refu-
gee Law Project, Position Paper on ICC 8−9 ( July 28, 2004), http://www.refugee 
lawproject.org/resources/papers/archive/2004/RLP.ICC.investig.pdf; Lucy Hovil & Joanna 
R. Quinn, Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda 23−30 (Refugee Law 
Project, Working Paper No. 17, 2005); Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 5. 
4 See, e.g., Pain, supra note 3, at 1. 
5 See Amnesty Act, 2000, pmbl.; Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 165–66; Pain, supra 
note 3, at 58−60; Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation 
Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to ICC ( Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi. 
int/press/pressreleases/16.html. 
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this article argues for two additions: a truth commission and a repara-
tions system. 
 Ideally, reconciliation in post-conflict northern Uganda would in-
volve admission of guilt by perpetrators and forgiveness by victims 
through some sort of dialogue. Communities would reintegrate former 
members of the LRA and victims would receive support to enable them 
to return to their homes and resume their lives. Communities would 
receive economic and social assistance so that the region as a whole 
could overcome a conflict that has left it impoverished and marginal-
ized. Though methods of reconciliation necessarily differ according to 
the particular context, some tools foster it more successfully than oth-
ers. This article examines how effectively Uganda’s Amnesty Act and 
traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms have fostered recon-
ciliation both during and post-conflict. 
 Justice and reconciliation in northern Uganda require more than 
amnesty and the use of traditional mechanisms, which respectively work 
more toward ending the conflict and fostering reintegration of former 
combatants.6 The prosecution of a handful of LRA leaders by the ICC 
could play a limited, though important, role in promoting accountabil-
ity and reconciliation in Uganda.7 To address the interests of victims of 
the conflict, however, a truth-telling process and reparations for victims 
and communities are necessary.8 A complex and unprecedented blend 
of transitional mechanisms would better serve Uganda than the current 
combination of amnesty, traditional practices, and criminal prosecu-
tions. Refining and adding to the current mixture will ultimately facili-
tate northern Uganda’s transition from conflict to peace. 
 Part I of this article provides a sketch of the conflict in northern 
Uganda, from its origins in 1986, to the resumption of peace talks in 
Juba, Sudan in April 2007. Part II describes Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 
2000 as well as three traditional Acholi justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms, and then analyzes the problems with the amnesty process 
and the traditional mechanisms. In light of these shortcomings, Part III 
explains the need for a truth-telling process and a reparations system 
and explores the relevance of various mechanisms used previously in 
Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Rwanda. Finally, Part IV ex-
amines the utility of ICC prosecutions, particularly in light of Sierra 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Amnesty Act; Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
7 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Chief Prosecutor, Statement at the International Crimi-
nal Court Concerning Arrest Warrants in the Uganda Situation 4−7 (Oct. 14, 2005), available 
at http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/Uganda_LMO_Speech_14102005.pdf. 
8 See Pham et al., supra note 1, at 35−36. 
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Leone’s experience with post-conflict criminal justice. Despite the am-
nesty process, traditional mechanisms, and ICC indictments, this article 
concludes that Uganda will only be able to effectively promote justice 
and reconciliation in northern Uganda through the addition of a truth-
telling process and a reparations system. 
I. Background on the Conflict in Northern Uganda 
 The conflict in northern Uganda has persisted since 1986, when 
President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) took power. The Lord’s Resistance Army emerged from Alice 
Auma Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), which aimed to over-
throw the newly established NRM government and enjoyed popular 
support from 1986 to 1987.9 In 1987, when Lakwena fled to Kenya after 
her forces suffered heavy casualties in a battle with the NRM, her sup-
posed cousin, Joseph Kony, assumed leadership of the remnants of the 
HSM.10 Under Kony’s command, the LRA purportedly aimed to over-
throw Uganda’s government, based in the southern capital of Kampala, 
and to rule Uganda according to the Ten Commandments.11 The LRA 
does not, however, have a “coherent ideology, rational political agenda, 
or popular support.”12 The LRA never crosses the Nile River, which di-
vides the northern and southern regions of Uganda, and though the 
LRA attacks government forces at times, it primarily targets northern 
Uganda’s civilian population, whom Kony claims to be punishing for 
their sins—particularly that of not supporting him.13 The fighting has 
largely taken place in the Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts of northern 
Uganda where the Acholi ethnic group dominates.14 
 The LRA’s atrocities include killings, beatings, mutilations, abduc-
tions, forced recruitment of children and adults, and sexual violence 
against girls who serve as “wives,” or sex slaves, for LRA commanders.15 
                                                                                                                      
9 Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State 
Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 403, 407 (2005). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Melanie Thernstrom, Charlotte, Grace, Janet and Caroline Come Home, N.Y. Times, May 8, 
2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 34; see also Int’l Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: Seizing the 
Opportunity for Peace 1 (2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/docu- 
ments/africa/central_africa/124_northern_uganda_seizing_the_opportunity_for_peace.pdf. 
14 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 13, at 1. 
15 Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten, Impunity and Human 
Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda 15 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 
2005/uganda0905/uganda0905.pdf [hereinafter Uprooted and Forgotten]. 
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Because the LRA lacks a popular base of support, it populates its forces 
almost exclusively through abduction and forced conscription of chil-
dren, usually ages eleven to fifteen.16 It has used these abducted chil-
dren to carry loot, sustain combat, and serve as sex slaves, while mutila-
tions have served to create perpetual insecurity among the civilian 
population.17 According to estimates, the LRA’s membership ranges 
from 1000 to 3000, with a core of 150 to 200 commanders and the rest 
consisting of abducted children (the LRA has abducted approximately 
20,000 children during the twenty year conflict).18 During the course of 
the conflict the LRA has looted and burned houses, storage granaries, 
shops, and entire villages in northern Uganda.19 The Ugandan People’s 
Defense Force (UPDF), the national military, has also committed hu-
man rights violations against civilians in northern Uganda, including 
extrajudicial execution, arbitrary detention, torture, rape and sexual 
assault, recruitment of children, and forcible relocation.20 Altogether, 
this prolonged conflict has had a severe socio-economic and psychoso-
cial impact . . . on the entire Acholi population.”21 
 The government of Sudan heavily supported the LRA until 2002, 
when the governments of Uganda and Sudan signed a treaty by which 
both countries agreed to stop supporting each other’s insurgents.22 
With the permission of the Sudanese government, the UPDF launched 
a military offensive in March 2002 against the LRA, known as “Opera-
tion Iron Fist.”23 Although the UPDF aimed to eradicate the LRA by 
attacking its camps in southern Sudan, the LRA instead fled back into 
                                                                                                                      
16 Akhavan, supra note 9, at 407. 
17 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 13, at 1. 
18 Pham et al., supra note 1, at 14. 
19 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Background Information on the Situation in Uganda 
( Jan. 1, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/s0204/s0204_b.html (follow “Background 
information on the situation in Uganda” hyperlink). 
20 Human Rights First, International Justice: Uganda, http://www.humanrightsfirst. 
org/international_justice/regions/uganda/uganda.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
21 The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the U.N. High Commission for Hu-
man Rights on the Mission Undertaken by Her Office Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2000/60, to 
Assess the Situation on the Ground with Regard to the Abduction of Children from Northern Uganda, 
¶ 14, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/86 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
22 The Ugandan government had allegedly supported the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 9. The unlikely 
alliance between the Islamist government of Sudan and the nominally Christian LRA grew 
out of the Sudanese government’s fear that the NRM would threaten its control over the 
non-Islamic, non-Arab southern part of Sudan. Akhavan, supra note 9, at 406. Sudan per-
ceived a link between the NRM and the SPLM/A and consequently supported the rem-
nants of the forces of Idi Amin, General Tito Okello, and Milton Obote. Id. 
23 Human Rights First, supra note 20. 
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northern Uganda where fighting and abductions intensified.24 The 
LRA also expanded the violence into eastern Uganda which had previ-
ously been less affected by the conflict.25 Since the start of Operation 
Iron Fist, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has grown 
from 450,000 to over 1.7 million.26 Since the mid-1990s, approximately 
three-fourths of the populations in the Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader dis-
tricts of northern Uganda have been displaced.27 
 In December 2003 President Museveni referred the problem of the 
LRA to the International Criminal Court.28 The government of Uganda 
reportedly conceived of the referral as a strategy for generally engaging 
the international community and specifically increasing international 
pressure on Sudan to stop it from supporting the LRA.29 In October 
2005, the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo unsealed arrest war-
rants for Kony and four other leaders: Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, 
Dominic Ongwen, and Rasaka Lukwiya.30 Their alleged crimes include 
rape, murder, slavery, sexual slavery, and forced enlistment of chil-
dren.31 As of this writing none of the indictees are in the custody of the 
Ugandan government or the ICC.32 Meanwhile, the ICC has confirmed 
the death of Rasaka Lukwiya, and Vincent Otti has reportedly been 
killed by Kony.33 Nevertheless, these arrest warrants reportedly rattled 
the LRA commanders who thereafter began to talk of a peace agree-
ment which would bring them immunity from prosecution.34 
                                                                                                                      
24 Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 9; Human Rights First, supra note 20. 
25 Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 9. 
26 Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Uganda: Uncertain Peace Process 
Impedes Return in North While Protection Crisis Looms in Karamoja Region 16, 
133 (2007), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org (follow “Africa” link under 
“Countries” tab; then follow “Uganda” hyperlink; then choose “Download full Internal 
Displacement Profile”); Human Rights First, supra note 20. 
27 Human Rights First, supra note 20. 
28 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 5. 
29 Akhavan, supra note 9, at 410. 
30 Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 7, at 4–7. 
31 Id. at 6. 
32 Helena Cobban, Op-ed., Uganda: When International Justice and Internal Peace are at 
Odds, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24, 2006, at 9; Emma Thomasson, Uganda Highlights 
Tension Between Peace and Justice, Reuters, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
featuredCrisis/idUSL03416900. 
33 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo on the Confirmation of the Death of Raska Lukwiya 1 (Nov. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20061107_en.pdf; Julius Ocen, 
LRA’s Foes Chafe at Peace Delay, ICC Update (Institute for War & Peace Reporting) Apr. 3, 
2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=343790&apc_state=heniacr200804. 
34 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
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 In the spring of 2006, a significant shift in the dynamics of this 
conflict occurred as the LRA began portraying itself as a politically 
motivated movement with legitimate grievances about the marginali-
zation of northern and eastern Uganda.35 In this vein, Kony appeared 
for the first time in May 2006 on a video in which he discussed peace, 
and denied the LRA’s involvement in the commission of war crimes.36 
Most importantly, in May and June 2006, a series of meetings took 
place between Kony and Riek Machar, the vice-president of southern 
Sudan and the second in command of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement.37 The government of southern Sudan took on the role of 
peace mediator because its leaders recognized that the LRA threat-
ened the potential for stability and development in southern Sudan.38 
 After years of military campaigns and indifferent or disingenuous 
participation in peace initiatives, the government of Uganda finally 
committed to high-level, sustained peace negotiations, called the Juba 
peace process, with the LRA in mid-July 2006.39 The agenda of the Juba 
peace process includes cessation of hostilities, a comprehensive solu-
tion to the conflict, reconciliation and accountability, a formal cease-
fire, and a plan for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.40 
The LRA and the government of Uganda successfully reached an 
agreement on the first of these issues.41 A cessation of hostilities agree-
ment came into effect on August 4, 2006, and was renewed in Novem-
ber and December 2006, though both sides had violated it.42 The 
agreement expired at the end of February 2007 after the LRA withdrew 
from the talks in January, demanding a change in venue and the re-
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 10−11. According to the International Crisis Group: 
 The motivation behind the image remaking is probably mixed. Defining 
itself as a politically-motivated insurgency may be part of an attempt to get a 
better practical deal. But constructing a vague and expanding agenda that 
the military leaders have not shown much concern for in the past may as well 
be a tactic in a campaign to regroup. The LRA wants to escape the ICC war-
rants and the U.S. terrorism list, and the peace talks offer a forum for its 
leaders to cultivate an image as misunderstood freedom fighters. 
Id. at 11. 
36 Tristan McConnell, Side Talks Could Be Key to Northern Uganda Peace Process, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, July 26, 2006, at 8. 
37 Tristan McConnell, Fresh Hope for Peace in Northern Uganda, Christian Sci. Monitor, 
June 26, 2006, at 7. 
38 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 13, at 11; McConnell, supra note 36. 
39 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 13, at 7; Cobban, supra note 32. 
40 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 13, at 3. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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placement of Machar as chief mediator.43 However, on April 26, 2007 
formal talks resumed in Juba, with representatives from South Africa, 
Kenya, Congo, Tanzania, and Mozambique acting as observers.44 
Meanwhile, President Museveni has promised that once the LRA and 
the government sign a peace deal, the government of Uganda will work 
to have the ICC drop its charges against the LRA leaders.45 The gov-
ernment has also announced that it will establish a $340 million fund to 
help northern Uganda.46 
II. Transitional Mechanisms in Uganda 
 Even before the conflict in northern Uganda had no clear end in 
sight, literature on the subject had already begun to address issues of 
reintegration and reconciliation.47 This discussion merits attention be-
cause thousands of former members of the LRA have sought amnesty 
and returned to their communities.48 Well before the Juba peace proc-
ess began in 2006, communities in northern Uganda had begun rein-
tegrating former LRA rebels and working towards reconciliation 
through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.49 The following 
section first examines Uganda’s Amnesty Act and the traditional Acholi 
practices and then analyzes how these two mechanisms alone may fall 
short of achieving reintegration and reconciliation. 
A. Amnesty 
1. The Contours of the Amnesty Act 
 Religious and cultural leaders in northern Uganda led the move-
ment towards ending the conflict through amnesty rather than through 
                                                                                                                      
43 Id. at 3, 5. 
44 Id. at 6. 
45 See Peace in Northern Uganda?, Policy Briefing-Africa 41 (Int’l Crisis Group, 
Nairobi/Brussels), Sept. 13, 2006, at 15 n. 112, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/doc- 
uments/africa/central_africa/b041_peace_in_northern_uganda.pdf. 
46 Tristan McConnell, Uganda Sees Local Justice as Key to Peace, Christian Sci. Monitor, 
Sept. 8, 2006, at 6. 
47 See sources cited supra note 1. 
48 See Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 7−8. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
at the end of January 2005, the number of applicants seeking amnesty was numbered at 
approximately 15,000. Id. at 7. 
49 See Peace in Northern Uganda?, supra note 45, at 2; Afako, supra note 1, at 67 (noting 
that, as early as 2001, ex-combatants from the LRA participated in a mato oput ceremony 
and were welcomed back to the community). 
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military force.50 Because of their efforts, the Ugandan Parliament en-
acted the Amnesty Act of 2000, which aimed to break the cycle of vio-
lence in northern Uganda by encouraging combatants of various rebel 
groups to leave their armed groups without fear of prosecution.51 Since 
its passage into law, Ugandans have largely supported the Amnesty Act 
and perceived it as a crucial tool for ending the violence and promot-
ing reconciliation.52 The Ugandan Parliament has repeatedly extended 
the expiration date of the Amnesty Act.53 
 The Act provides amnesty for any Ugandan who has engaged in, or 
is engaging in, war or armed rebellion against the government of 
Uganda since January 26, 1986.54 Those granted amnesty under the Act 
receive “a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal 
prosecution or any other form of punishment by the State.”55 Amnesty 
is available for any Ugandan who has actually participated in combat, 
collaborated with perpetrators of, committed a crime in furtherance of, 
or assisted or aided the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed 
rebellion.56 Thus, there are two broad categories of Ugandans eligible 
for amnesty: combatants who took up arms and non-combatants who 
were dependents, camp workers, porters, and other abducted per-
sons.57 According to the Amnesty Act, the government will not prose-
cute or punish such persons if they report to the nearest local or cen-
tral government authority, renounce and abandon involvement in the 
war or armed rebellion, and surrender any weapons in their posses-
sion.58 In renouncing involvement, the rebels’ declarations need not be 
onerous or specify the crimes for which they seek amnesty.59 After a re-
bel has completed the above steps, he or she becomes a “reporter” 
                                                                                                                      
50 Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 3, 5. For a thorough analysis of the intervention of 
the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, see Khadiagala, supra note 1. 
51 Amnesty Act, 2000, pmbl. (Uganda); Pham et al., supra note 1, at 46. 
52 U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, Uganda, 
http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=37 (follow “Background” hyperlink) (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
53 Id. 
54 Amnesty Act, ¶ 2. 
55 ¶ 3. 
56 Id. The Amnesty Act is silent as to the age of the person to be granted amnesty, but 
the Amnesty Commission has decided that only persons over twelve years old may qualify 
for amnesty because twelve is the age of criminal responsibility in Uganda. U.N. Disarma-
ment, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra note 52 (follow “DDR 
Strategy and Approach” hyperlink). 
57 U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra note 
52 (follow “DDR Strategy and Approach” hyperlink). 
58 Amnesty Act, 2000, ¶ 4 (Uganda); Pham et al., supra note 1, at 47. 
59 Pham et al., supra note 1, at 47. 
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whose file the Amnesty Commission reviews before a Certificate of Am-
nesty is issued and the process is completed.60 According to the United 
Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Center, the 
total number of potential reporters is in the tens of thousands, and as 
of December 2006, 21,000 reporters had received amnesty.61 
 In addition, the Amnesty Act establishes the Amnesty Commission, 
whose objectives are “to persuade reporters to take advantage of the 
amnesty and to encourage communities to reconcile with those who 
have committed the offenses.”62 The Commission consists of a chair-
person, a judge of the Ugandan High Court (or a person qualified to 
be a judge of the High Court), and six other “persons of high moral 
integrity.”63 The Commission’s functions specifically require it to moni-
tor programs of demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement of re-
porters and to coordinate a program to sensitize the general public 
about the Amnesty Act.64 In 2005 the Commission began to run a Dis-
armament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program (DDR), which 
involves sensitization and dialogue, the processing of reporters, social 
and economic reintegration, support for children and women, and 
monitoring and evaluation.65 The Commission fulfills its mandate 
                                                                                                                      
60 Amnesty Act, ¶ 4. 
61 U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra note 
52 (follow “DDR Strategy and Approach” hyperlink). Of the 21,000 reporters who received 
amnesty, 19,000 have received an initial reinsertion or resettlement kit. Id. Additionally, of 
the 21,000 reporters, 17,106 (79%) were male and 4547 (21%) were female, and 6718 
were children between twelve and eighteen years of age. Id. 
62 Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 7 (quoting Amnesty Commission Handbook, § 3.11). 
63 Amnesty Act, ¶¶ 7–8. The current chairman of the Amnesty Commission is High 
Court Justice Peter Onega. See Charles Ariko, Ex-LRA Men Get Amnesty, New Vision, Jan. 
21, 2008, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/607788. 
64 Amnesty Act, 2000, ¶ 9(a)–(b) (Uganda). 
65 Int’l Crisis Group, Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern 
Uganda 8 (2005); U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Cen-
tre, supra note 52 (follow “Area of Activity” hyperlink). Sensitization and dialogue encour-
ages reporters to return to their communities and also builds confidence between the 
reporters and the government by providing promotional materials in local languages, or-
ganization for community gatherings, support for reconciliation, and education to poten-
tial reporters about the advantages of reporting for amnesty. U.N. Disarmament, Demobi-
lization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra note 52 (follow “Area of Activity” 
hyperlink). Under the direction of DDR, the processing of reporters involves identifying 
and screening potential reporters, issuing Certificates of Amnesty, providing gender sensi-
tive psychosocial support, administering medical assessments, distributing in-kind and cash 
assistance, and providing counseling and referral services regarding reintegration. Id. The 
in-kind assistance packages consist of a mattress, blanket, jerry can, plastic basin, a panga 
(a knife used for cutting vegetation), two saucepans, two sets of clothing, two hand hoes, 
and five kilograms each of bean seeds and maize seeds. Id. The cash assistance consists of 
US$122.00 as a general support fund, US$10.50 for medical costs, and US$10.00 for trans-
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through implementing partners, which include national and interna-
tional NGOs and international organizations, such as various U.N. 
agencies.66 According to the International Center for Transitional Jus-
tice, the Commission is efficient and well-functioning despite challeng-
ing circumstances.67 It also maintains good relationships with northern 
Uganda’s civil society.68 Finally, the Act creates a seven-member Demo-
bilization and Resettlement Team (DRT) which functions at a regional 
level by establishing programs for decommissioning arms, demobiliza-
tion, resettlement, and reintegration of reporters.69 
 The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
(MDRP) played a highly significant role in implementing the Amnesty 
Commission’s mandate, and therefore merits brief mention. The 
MDRP “is a multi-agency effort that supports the demobilization and 
reintegration of ex-combatants in Central Africa’s greater lakes region, 
including Uganda.”70 MDRP complements national and regional peace 
initiatives by providing financial and technical support for demobiliza-
tion as well as social and economic reintegration.71 MDRP’s Uganda 
project aimed to reintegrate approximately 15,300 reporters into civil-
ian life within the context of the Amnesty Act.72 The project supported 
                                                                                                                      
port costs incurred in returning home. Id. Social reintegration involves promoting recon-
ciliation between reporters and their families and communities “via traditional reconcilia-
tion mechanisms, religious meetings, and community-welcoming gatherings.” Id. Eco-
nomic reintegration involves both counseling and referring reporters to vocational 
training and income-generating opportunities. Id. The United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Multi-Country Demobi-
lization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) have all supported the Amnesty Commission 
in social and economic reintegration. Id. 
66 U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra note 
52 (follow “Area of Activity” hyperlink). 
67 Pham et al., supra note 1, at 47 (noting that the Commission is inadequately funded). 
68 Id. 
69 Amnesty Act, ¶¶ 11–13. 
70 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, About Us, http://www. 
mdrp.org/about_us.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). MDRP currently targets approxi-
mately 450,000 ex-combatants from Angola, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. Id. MDRP is a collaborative 
effort of over forty entities, including regional governments and organizations, the United 
Nations, and international financial institutions. Id. Financing for the MDRP comes from 
the World Bank as well as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission. Id. 
71 See id. 
72 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, MDPR Fact Sheet 
1 (2007), available at http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_UGA_FS_1007.pdf. MDRP demo-
bilized and provided reinsertion support to 16,256 and 14,816 ex-combatants, respectively. Id. 
Most of the target group consisted of ex-LRA rebels and abductees, but the target group also 
included ex-members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile Bank Front 
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the implementation of nearly every aspect of the Amnesty Commis-
sion’s activities.73 In addition, the project was involved in strengthening 
the Amnesty Commission as an institution by recruiting and training 
staff, installing a financial management system, and procuring equip-
ment.74 A US $4.2 million MDRP trust fund grant contributed to reliev-
ing the funding shortages suffered by the Amnesty Commission.75 
When the Commission officially launched this project in mid-2005, the 
backlog of reporters who had not received reinsertion assistance at the 
time when they were granted amnesty had climbed to nearly 11,200.76 
Because of this fund, however, by August 2006 the Commission had de-
livered resettlement support to 11,851 reporters and had made prepa-
rations to support ninety-five percent of registered reporters by the end 
of October 2006.77 The MDRP formally closed its Uganda effort on 
June 30, 2007 after successfully meeting its target goals to strengthen 
the Amnesty Commission and provide support for the reintegration of 
approximately 15,000 ex-combatants.78 
2. The Shortcomings of the Amnesty Process 
 Despite the accomplishments of the Amnesty Commission, the 
Amnesty Act may fail to achieve reconciliation because the resettlement 
packages have been so contentious, basic operational problems have 
plagued the Commission, and because the Commission has not ex-
                                                                                                                      
(WNBF), Force Obote Back/Ninth October Movement (FOBA/NOM), Uganda National 
Democratic Alliance Front (UDA/F) and the Uganda National Freedom Movement/Army 
(UNFM/A). Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Uganda, http:// 
www.mdrp.org/uganda.htm (follow “Special Projects” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). 
73 See id. 
74 Id. 
75 U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra note 
52 (follow “Funding” hyperlink). By comparison, from 2002 to 2004, the Internal Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM), United States Agency for International Development, UNI-
CEF, and the European Union (EU) provided support totaling US $694,004. Id. The 
UNDP provided US $300,000 in 2003 and US $553,774 from 2005 to 2006. Id. 
76 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Progress Re-
port and Work Plan: July–Sept. 2005, at 6 (2005), http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/pro- 
greport_2005_q3.pdf. 
77 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, Quarterly 
Progress Report July–Sept. 2006, at 7 (2006), http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/2006-Q3- 
QPR-MDRP.pdf. 
78 See Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, supra note 72, 
at 1. It is unknown whether the MDRP will launch another Ugandan effort in the future. 
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panded its functions to include a truth-telling process.79 The resettle-
ment packages have been particularly contentious in northern Uganda 
and may foster resentment and hinder reconciliation unless the gov-
ernment handles them with greater sensitivity.80 According to the Refu-
gee Law Project, the issue of resettlement packages has “become the 
primary focus . . . of the Amnesty Law for the majority of ex-combatants 
interviewed, and is the major issue when considering the current po-
tential for reintegration into the region.”81 Many former rebels view the 
government’s untimely distribution of resettlement packages as a fail-
ure to honor its commitments to the reporters.82 In addition, resent-
ment exists among some displaced, impoverished non-combatants who 
perceive the packages as perversely rewarding the former rebels for 
having committed atrocities.83 Communities sometimes fail to under-
stand why the government offers assistance to the former rebels but not 
to the other community members they victimized.84 
 The issue of resettlement packages has created divisions not only 
between former rebels and their communities, but also between the 
former rebels themselves.85 The treatment of former high-level rebels 
and average returnees is widely disparate.86 Many former LRA rebels 
have returned to their homes or IDP camps with delayed or nonexis-
tent resettlement packages and with little further monitoring or follow-
up by the government.87 Because reporters sometimes reintegrate into 
IDP camps, where the living conditions are quite harsh, a risk persists 
that such reporters will return to the bush.88 In contrast, some former 
high-level rebels receive twenty-four hour armed protection by the 
UPDF and live as guests in UPDF barracks or in a renovated hotel asso-
ciated with the UPDF.89 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Jeremy Ginifer, Dep’t for Int’l Dev., Internal Review of DFID’s Engagement 
with the Conflict in Northern Uganda 17 (2006), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ 
aboutdfid/performance/files/ev663.pdf; Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 38–39. 
80 Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 38–39. 
81 Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 16. 
82 See id. 
83 Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 38–39. 
84 Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 14. 
85 Id. at 18. 
86 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 39 (noting that rebel commanders live 
in relative luxury compared to average reporters). 
87 Id. 
88 See U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra 
note 52 (follow “Area of Activity” hyperlink). 
89 Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 39. 
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 A second problem with the amnesty process is that resource issues 
have severely constrained the effectiveness of the Amnesty Commis-
sion.90 The release of World Bank funds, via the MDRP, was inexplicably 
delayed by approximately two years, during which time virtually no rein-
tegration took place.91 Consequently, the credibility of both the Com-
mission and the amnesty process has often been threatened by large 
backlogs of reporters who have not received reinsertion assistance.92 
Long delays have plagued the ability of reporters to receive assistance 
packages and Certificates of Amnesty.93 This lack of final certificates is 
very troubling for LRA returnees because the certificates indicate com-
pliance with the Amnesty Act and, thus, are seen as protection against 
future harassment and prosecution.94 Furthermore, “[s]uch failings are 
significant, as the peace process envisaged by the Acholi community de-
pends heavily on the successful reintegration of the first wave of ‘report-
ers’ serving as an incitement to additional LRA fighters to desert and 
come forward.”95 The Commission’s credibility is particularly important 
given that LRA members may already mistrust the government’s am-
nesty offer because former Ugandan governments had previously of-
fered amnesties, which had resulted in the mass murder of soldiers who 
had accepted the offers.96 
 Finally, the Amnesty Act could fail to reach its potential as a tool 
for reconciliation because the Commission has not fulfilled its broader 
functions, including a truth-telling process.97 Under the Amnesty Act, 
the Commission must consider and promote appropriate reconciliation 
mechanisms in northern Uganda, encourage dialogue and reconcilia-
tion within the spirit of the Amnesty Act, and “perform any other func-
                                                                                                                      
90 See Ginifer, supra note 79, at 17. 
91 See id. 
92 See U.N. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre, supra 
note 52 (follow “Area of Activity” hyperlink). 
93 Willet Weeks, Pushing the Envelope: Moving Beyond “Protected Villages” 
in Northern Uganda 16 (2002). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 17. 
96 See Citizens for Global Solutions, supra note 1, at 26. According to one scholar: 
 Part of the lukewarm response to the Amnesty by the rebels results from 
the history of mistrust. While the ARLP has tried to allay the fear of returning 
about retribution, there are past publicized cases of the disappearance of re-
turnees. More recently, widespread reports of the army inducting former ab-
ducted children into its structures do not often help the [sic] sell the Am-
nesty. 
Khadiagala, supra note 1, at 15. 
97 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 15, at 38. 
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tion that is associated or connected with the execution of the functions 
stipulated in [the] Act.”98 In keeping with this provision, the Commis-
sion has supported the use of traditional cleansing ceremonies, thereby 
working to fulfill its mandate to promote appropriate reconciliation 
mechanisms.99 Yet this provision of the Amnesty Act also suggests that 
the Commission can, and should, adopt a truth-telling function or es-
tablish formal links with traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.100 
A truth-telling process, perhaps in the form of a truth commission, 
would help to foster dialogue, which could promote reconciliation in 
northern Uganda and between northern Uganda and the rest of the 
country. Instituting such a process would also be in keeping with the 
language of the Act’s provisions, as well as the goal of fostering reinte-
gration.101 
B. Traditional Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms 
 Traditional Acholi leaders have strongly advocated the use of tradi-
tional justice and reconciliation ceremonies as mechanisms for reinte-
gration in the post-conflict context.102 According to Acholi customs, 
when an offender declares that he or she has committed a wrong, the 
traditional conflict management system is triggered.103 The dispute 
resolution process identifies certain behaviors as kir, or taboo.104 Such 
                                                                                                                      
98 Amnesty Act, 2000, ¶ 9(c)–(e) (Uganda). 
99 Erin Baines et al., War-Affected Children and Youth in Northern Uganda: 
Toward a Brighter Future 4 (2006). The Amnesty Commission enjoys trust and respect 
on the local level, but “lacks the expertise and resources to capitalize on this good will by 
initiating discussions aimed at implementing new programs,” such as those that could 
incorporate traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms. Id. at 26–27. 
100 See Amnesty Act, ¶ 9(c)–(e). 
101 See ¶ 9(a), (e). 
102 See Pham et al., supra note 1, annex 4, at 50. Although traditional chiefs did not 
have any legal status for most of the last century, their legitimacy was never destroyed and 
many continued to operate informally. See id.; Afako, supra note 1, at 65. In 1911, colonially 
appointed chiefs, known as rwodi kalam, replaced the traditional chiefs, known as rwodi. 
Afako, supra note 1, at 65. The 1965 Constitution abolished the system of traditional chiefs 
altogether. Pham et al., supra note 1, annex 4, at 50 n. 81. The 1995 Constitution, how-
ever, led to the revival of traditional institutions and allowed traditional leaders to exist 
throughout Uganda. Afako, supra note 1, at 65. Furthermore, in 2000, a civil society initia-
tive reinstated many traditional leaders, including the Acholi Traditional Leaders Council 
and the head chief, known as lawi rwodi. See Pham et al., supra note 1, annex 4, at 50 (not-
ing that rwodi elect the law rwodi); Afako, supra note 1, at 65. In general, the chiefs’ politi-
cal independence gives them enhanced credibility in mediation and reconciliation. Afako, 
supra note 1, at 65. 
103 Pham et al., supra note 1, annex 4, at 50. 
104 See id. 
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offenses “may range from the criminal to the antisocial—violent acts, 
disputes over resources, and sexual misconduct—including behavior 
that would prevent the settlement of the dispute.”105 Clans must then 
cleanse the kir through rituals, which help to reaffirm communal val-
ues.106 Many argue that such traditional mechanisms for cleansing, jus-
tice, and reconciliation represent important channels for reintegration 
and reconciliation which can and should be widely adopted.107 The fol-
lowing details a cleansing ceremony, known as nyono tong gweno (the 
stepping on the egg ceremony), and two justice and reconciliation 
processes and ceremonies, known as mato oput (drinking of the bitter 
root), and gomo tong (the bending of the spears).108 
1. Three Ceremonies 
a. Nyono Tong Gweno (Stepping on Eggs) 
 The cleansing ceremony, known as nyono tong gweno, or stepping 
on eggs, takes place upon the return of an individual who has spent a 
significant amount of time away from the community, particularly after 
having done something immoral or amoral.109 According to anthro-
pologist Tim Allen, “[n]yono tong gweno is a ritual that just about anyone 
can perform, although it should be performed at someone’s own 
home.”110 The ritual cleanses foreign elements to prevent them from 
entering the community and bringing it misfortune.111 During the 
ceremony the returnee steps on a raw egg which symbolizes innocence, 
or something pure or untouched.112 Its crushed shell represents how 
foreign elements crush the community’s life.113 In addition, a twig from 
the opobo tree and the layibi, which is the stick for opening the granary, 
also accompany the ceremony.114 The twig symbolizes cleansing be-
cause soap is traditionally made from the opobo tree and the layibi marks 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 50–51. 
107 For literature advocating the use of traditional mechanisms, see generally Pain, su-
pra note 3, at 2; Hovil & Lomo, supra note 1, at 26; Hovil & Quinn, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
108 See Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 166. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Pham et al., supra note 1, annex 4, at 51. 
112 Id.; Mark Lacey, Victims of Uganda Atrocities Choose a Path of Forgiveness, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 18, 2005, at A1. 
113 Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 166. 
114 Id. 
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the individual’s return to eat where he or she has eaten before.115 
These individual cleansing ceremonies have been adapted to the cur-
rent context in northern Uganda and now routinely take place when-
ever former LRA members return to their communities.116 Most agen-
cies that receive and reintegrate former combatants ensure that the 
somewhat bureaucratic amnesty process also incorporates traditional 
ceremonies, which are usually performed at the agencies.117 
b. Mato Oput (Drinking of the Bitter Root) 
 In his 1997 report, The Bending of Spears, sociologist Dennis Pain 
identified mato oput as an important mechanism for fostering peace 
and justice in northern Uganda.118 Pain’s report has since generated 
much speculation about mato oput’s exact contours and current appli-
cability.119 Because Pain appears to have conflated mato oput and gomo 
tong, this article draws instead upon the field research of other schol-
ars and NGOs, including a relatively recent and highly detailed report 
by the Liu Institute for Global Issues and the Gulu District NGO Fo-
rum (Liu Institute).120 As detailed below, mato oput is both a process 
and a ceremony which takes place in the context of an intentional or 
accidental killing.121 This long and sophisticated process of reconcilia-
tion, which may last for weeks, months, or even years, involves a sepa-
ration of the affected clans, mediation, and payment of compensa-
                                                                                                                      
115 Id. For another example of this cleansing ceremony, see Lacey, supra note 112 (not-
ing that after stepping in a freshly cracked egg, brushing against a pobo tree, and stepping 
over a pole, the returnees were welcomed back to the community). In the case of return-
ing children, the nyono tong gweno ceremony is sometimes followed by a “washing away the 
tears” ceremony. Pham et al., supra note 1, annex 4, at 51. In this ceremony, which sym-
bolizes the “washing away the tears shed over the child,” the child’s parents slaughter a 
goat and pour water on the roof of the home where the child will live. Id. (noting that 
because many cannot afford to slaughter a goat, the ceremony is not very common). 
116 See Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
117 See Afako, supra note 1, at 65. 
118 See Pain, supra note 3, at 2. 
119 See Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 54. Pain describes mato oput as involving an 
acceptance of responsibility, indication of repentance, and compensation. Pain, supra note 
3, at 82. Reconciliation occurs with the simultaneous shared drinking of bitter root from a 
common calabash and with the bending of two spears. Id. Pain argues that the donor 
community should fund the payment compensation required by mato oput. Id. at 2–3. He 
generally champions traditional Acholi mechanisms for the resolution of conflict and vio-
lence as “among the highest practices anywhere in the world” and “far beyond the limited 
approaches of conservative western legal systems and formal amnesty for offences against 
the state.” Id. at 2. 
120 See Pain, supra note 3, at 82. See generally Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1. 
121 Id. at 54. 
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tion.122 The process might not begin until as many as ten or twenty 
years following the killing, after misfortunes have befallen the offend-
ing clan and social pressure has motivated the perpetrator, or the 
perpetrator’s family, to seek reconciliation.123 
 The first step in the process of mato oput involves a separation of 
the affected clans which serves as a cooling off period to prevent im-
mediate revenge killings.124 This separation requires the complete sus-
pension of relations between the families of the perpetrator and the 
victim, during which time the clans are forbidden to intermarry, trade, 
socialize, or share food and drink.125 Such separation is significant be-
cause of the communal nature of Acholi culture, wherein families from 
various clans share food, water, land, and social relations.126 The second 
step in mato oput involves a mediation process, which allows the affected 
families to create an account of the facts which emphasizes the perpe-
trator’s voluntary confession, including the motives, the circumstances 
of the crime, and an expression of remorse.127 In Acholi culture, until 
the perpetrator confesses and seeks rectification, the spirit of the dead 
may plague the perpetrator’s family through nightmares, sickness, and 
death.128 Finally, in the last step, the family of the perpetrator pays 
compensation raised through the contributions of clan members.129 
Such compensation must be “affordable, so as not to prevent the resto-
ration of relations, and will usually consist of cattle or money.”130 
 After this process, a day-long mato oput ceremony takes place.131 
The local chief, rwot moo, presides over this ceremony, which brings to-
gether the clans of the perpetrator and the victim in order to re-
                                                                                                                      
122 See Sverker Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings: War and Existential 
Uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda 297 (2003) (reporting that one cere-
mony lasted for ten years); Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 54–56. 
123 See Finnström, supra note 122, at 297; Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 55. 
124 Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 55. 
125 Finnström, supra note 122, at 297; Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 55. 
126 Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 55. 
127 See id. at 55–56. 
128 Id. at 55. 
129 Id. at 56. 
 To compensate for a life (culo kwor), can mean several forms of compensa-
tion, people pointed out. For example, it can also describe the nation’s re-
sponsibility to pay pensions or to compensate economically the family of a 
person who dies on duty. Ultimately this is the responsibility of the president, 
people said. 
Finnström, supra note 122, at 296. 
130 Pham et al., supra note 1, at 51. 
131 See Finnström, supra note 122, at 291. 
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establish harmony.132 Communal involvement in the ceremony as well 
as the process of mato oput reflects the Acholi belief that the perpetra-
tor’s offense affects the whole clan.133 The mato oput ceremony consists 
of an elaborate set of final, symbolic acts which conclude the reconcilia-
tion process and restore unity between the parties.134 Although differ-
ent clans follow a similar process leading up to the ceremony, the 
ceremony itself varies widely across clans.135 Despite these variations, 
the following symbolic acts generally take place during a mato oput cere-
mony. 
 First, the offending party beats a stick to broadly symbolize mato 
oput’s restorative purpose and then runs away to signify acceptance of 
guilt for the murder.136 Second, the parties cut in half a sheep and a 
goat and exchange opposite sides. The offending clan supplies the 
sheep, which represents the cen, or misfortune, haunting the clan of 
the offender, while the injured clan supplies the goat, which symbolizes 
unity and a willingness to forgive and reconcile.137 Third, the clans eat 
boo mukwok, spoiled boo, or local greens, which signifies that tension 
between the clans persisted long enough for food to spoil, and also 
symbolizes the clans’ readiness to reconcile after this long period of 
time.138 Fourth, a representative from each party drinks oput, bitter 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Pham et al., supra note 1, at 51; Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 54. Even in 
the midst of war, this reconciliation ritual has taken place in Acholiland to settle clan 
feuds. Finnström, supra note 122, at 296. 
133 Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 54. Also, according to Finnström, “compensa-
tion and reconciliation rather than revenge or blood vengeance is the institutionalized 
Acholi way of handling disputes, homicides and unnatural deaths.” Finnström, supra note 
122, at 291. 
134 Id. at 57–58. Scholar Tim Allen describes mato oput as follows: “[A] ritual performed 
to reconcile social divisions after a case of killing. It deals with the consequences of homi-
cide. Those who play the main part in performing it are the wrongdoer and a representa-
tive of the family he or she has harmed (and clan elders).” Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 
133. 
135 Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 56. According to the Liu Institute, “[t]here is 
need for further documentation of these differences if Mato Oput is to be applied com-
munally by Ker Kwaro in the context of the new conflict.” Id. Ker Kwaro is an executive insti-
tution of the head Acholi Chief comprised of nineteen Rwodi and Elders, a youth repre-
sentative, and two women representatives. Id at 125. 
136 Id. at 57. The Liu Institute provides several differing accounts of the precise ways in 
which the beating of the stick symbolizes restoration. Id. According to one elder, “[t]he 
beating of the stick illustrates to the spirit of the murdered person that he or she is cared 
for.” Id. Another elder noted that the stick symbolizes “truth.” Id. 
137 Id. at 10, 57. An elder stated that, “the sheep and goat represent the two parties 
prior to Mato Oput (separate entities), and the cutting and mixing symbolize the uniting of 
the two parties.” Id. at 57. “In another account, however, the sheep was said to symbolize 
humility, because a sheep is a humble animal.” Id. 
138 Id. at 57. 
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root, from a calabash.139 The root represents the bitterness between the 
clans, and drinking it symbolizes washing away the bitterness between 
them.140 Fifth, both parties cook and eat the acwiny, liver, of the sheep 
and the goat to show that their blood has been mixed and united and 
to symbolically wash away the bitterness within the blood of the human 
liver.141 One of the last rituals involves consuming odeyo, the remains of 
a saucepan, which is thought to free the parties to eat together again.142 
The ceremony is not complete until the parties have eaten all of the 
food prepared for the day; finishing the food means that no bitterness 
remains between the two clans.143 
c. Gomo Tong (the Bending of the Spears) 
 Gomo tong, or the bending of the spears, is a peace-making cere-
mony, which marks the resolution of violent conflict.144 Sverker Finn-
ström describes gomo tong as “an inter-ethnic reconciliation ritual” 
which does not involve economic compensation.145 The parties make 
vows that the killings will not be renewed and each party then bends a 
spear into the shape of a “U” and gives it to the other, thereby signaling 
that renewed violence will “turn back on them.”146 The performance of 
this ritual is reportedly very rare and may have been last performed 
when the Acholi people and the people of the West Nile reconciled in 
the 1980s after the fall of Idi Amin.147 
                                                                                                                      
139 Id. 
140 Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 57. According to a report from the Interna-
tional Center for Transitional Justice, “[r]epresentatives from the perpetrator’s and vic-
tim’s clans kneel together, with their hands behind them and their foreheads touching, to 
drink the concoction . . . . Sometimes all members of a clan will drink (in pairs) until the 
juice is finished.” Pham et al., supra note 1, at 51. The report also noted that the root’s 
bitterness “symbolizes the nature of the crime and the loss of life.” Id. 
141 Roco Wat I Acoli, supra note 1, at 58. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. According to some elders, “Mato Oput was not formally completed until the life 
lost was replaced with a new one. Historically, a young girl from the offending clan was 
given as compensation to the victim’s clan for marriage.” Id. at 56. 
144 See Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 133. 
145 Finnström, supra note 122, at 291, 298. 
146 War and Justice, supra note 1, at 67; Finnström, supra note 122, at 298–99. 
147 See Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 133; War and Justice, supra note 1, at 86; Finn-
ström, supra note 122, at 298–99. A particularly famous use of a gomo tong reconciliation 
ceremony occurred between the Payira and Koch clans in order to protect the clans 
against invading colonialists. See Trial Justice, supra note 1, at 133; Finnström, supra 
note 122, at 298. Another use occurred during the Amin years, from 1971 to 1979, when 
Acholi people were targeted by state violence. See Finnström, supra note 122, at 298. 
Sverter Finnström explains that, after Amin’s fall, revenge killing of people living in the 
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2. Problems with the Application of Traditional Mechanisms 
 Although Acholi chiefs have advocated the use of traditional 
mechanisms, and the Amnesty Commission has supported their use, 
such mechanisms may fall short of significantly promoting justice.148 
The application and relevance of such ceremonies to the atrocities 
committed by the LRA is questionable for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing the lack of knowledge among the Acholi of mato oput, the degree to 
which the Acholi capacity to forgive has been overestimated, and the 
unusually severe nature of this conflict.149 
a. Lack of Knowledge of Mato Oput 
 Widespread firsthand knowledge of mato oput is lacking among the 
Acholi.150 According to Tim Allen, most local knowledge of mato oput 
and gomo tong is secondhand and relatively few elders have actually per-
formed mato oput.151 Not only is there a general absence of systematic 
documentation of mato oput, but there is also wide variation in mato oput 
practices and ceremonies throughout Acholiland, which thereby exac-
erbates the need for such documentation.152 Also, because the Acholi 
no longer widely practice mato oput, younger generations are unable to 
fully understand mato oput.153 Furthermore, those who are unfamiliar 
with the rituals generally do not gain exposure to them because they are 
typically held at reception centers in district centers where only small 
audiences bear witness.154 In addition, non-Acholis in northern Uganda 
and southern Sudan have also been greatly affected by the LRA conflict 
since 2002, but have relatively little knowledge of Acholi traditional 
practices and may question their relevance to them.155 In the context of 
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this lack of knowledge of mato oput, the newly re-established rwodi, tradi-
tional chiefs, have allocated a different or more generalized meaning to 
mato oput, which now sometimes refers to nyono tong gweno or to the cere-
monies performed by the rwodi moo to promote forgiveness and the re-
integration of former LRA combatants.156 
b. Overestimation of the Acholi Capacity to Forgive 
 The efficacy of these ceremonies and the Acholi capacity to forgive 
may have been inflated or overestimated by researchers, journalists, 
humanitarian aid organizations, Acholi elders, and Catholic leaders in 
the region.157 According to the received wisdom, these traditional 
mechanisms reflect the special capacity of the Acholi people to forgive 
and to reintegrate offenders into society.158 International aid agencies 
have tended not to question such portrayals of local beliefs and prac-
tices by Acholi leaders.159 Also, Catholic leaders in northern Uganda 
have very successfully promoted the idea of forgiveness through NGOs 
and the local council system and have thereby played a significant role 
in pressuring the Ugandan government to pass and implement the 
Amnesty Act.160 Additionally, the perception that children, who are less 
responsible for their actions, have largely perpetrated this war has gen-
erally reinforced the promotion of forgiveness.161 
 Assertions about Acholi views on forgiveness should be closely 
questioned, however, as attitudes towards forgiveness, amnesty, and 
criminal justice are more inconsistent than many have often claimed.162 
First, the very existence of mato oput does not necessarily signify that 
Acholi conceptions of forgiveness are unique.163 Mechanisms for clean-
sing, social healing, and dispute settlement are not unusual within this 
region of Africa and are as likely to concern setting aside or forgetting 
offenses as recalling and forgiving them.164 Second, in recent years, 
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academics, NGOs, human rights activists, and journalists have begun to 
challenge the widely accepted notion that the Acholi people have a 
“special capacity to forgive.”165 A survey by the International Center for 
Transitional Justice shows that community leaders and victims are di-
vided on the topics of justice, accountability, and reconciliation.166 Vic-
tims interviewed by Human Rights Watch apparently “did not agree 
with the prospect of having the LRA leaders forgiven . . . but instead 
wanted justice, even retribution.”167 Many former child soldiers have 
reportedly returned from the bush to find themselves homeless be-
cause “[t]hey cannot go back to villages where people recall the night 
they returned with the rebels and massacred their relatives and 
neighbors—and sometimes, even, their own parents.”168 While Acholis 
“know that all but a few of the oldest commanders were themselves 
once abducted children, their pity for the rebels as victims is overlaid 
with hatred and fear of them as victimizers.”169 Human Rights Watch 
asserts that even if the community has accepted perpetrators back into 
the community, individual victims may not want to forgive the perpetra-
tors of serious crimes.170 
 Just as assumptions about Acholi notions of forgiveness merit scru-
tiny, so do claims about Acholi opposition to criminal justice. Many 
have seized on the contrasting approaches of traditional Acholi 
mechanisms and the ICC and have emphasized Acholi support for the 
former and opposition to the latter.171 Tim Allen found in his field re-
search that most of his informants in IDP camps did not generally re-
ject international criminal justice, but instead expressed a willingness to 
see Kony and his senior commanders prosecuted, coupled with con-
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cerns about the security implications of their arrest warrants.172 Allen 
found that many people seemed to be embarrassed about wanting ac-
countability, revenge, or compensation and his informants were gener-
ally only willing to talk of such desires in private.173 Allocation of re-
sponsibility by an external actor seemed more appealing than was 
assumed and mato oput did not garner particularly widespread enthusi-
asm.174 Also, Allen very significantly notes that he has “not yet come 
across any confirmed instances of mato oput being performed to reinte-
grate a former LRA combatant, although this is often claimed to be 
taking place.”175 Ultimately, perhaps the people of northern Uganda 
require some of the same conventional legal mechanisms as those en-
joyed by people living in more developed States.176 
c. Mato Oput May Not Apply to These Circumstances 
 Finally, mato oput, in its traditional form, does not readily apply to 
the mass atrocities committed by the LRA.177 First, mato oput ceremo-
nies may not be sufficient given the scale and nature of the LRA atroci-
ties.178 Mato oput traditionally applied only to less serious cases of man-
slaughter, not to wanton killing, rape, or mutilation or a killing between 
enemies during a war.179 According to Tim Allen, even those promoting 
the use of mato oput acknowledge that it was a mechanism used for indi-
vidual cases, not for collective dispute settlement.180 Also, the nature of 
the atrocities committed by the LRA often precludes reconciliation be-
tween the perpetrator’s and victim’s clans because of the perpetrator’s 
inability to identify his or her victim and thereafter to confess, ask for 
the forgiveness of, and pay compensation to the victim’s clan.181 Perpe-
trators are typically unaware of the victim’s identity or clan or the loca-
tion of the crime because the LRA’s movement around the three dis-
tricts of northern Uganda often leaves its abductees unfamiliar with the 
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people and the places they attack.182 Additionally, because the atrocities 
committed during this conflict are new to the Acholi culture, parties 
may be unsure as to what type of compensation is necessary for recon-
ciliation, or whether compensation for these types of crimes is possible 
at all.183 
 The second problem is that the ongoing nature of this conflict 
also obstructs the application of mato oput and gomo tong.184 Mato oput 
may not apply to the current situation in northern Uganda because a 
conflict must end before reconciliation may be fostered through mato 
oput.185 Because mato oput and gomo tong must consist of a mutual act 
of reconciliation, which involves all parties in a profound way, the 
LRA would have to come out of the bush and participate in the cere-
mony as a group.186 Therefore, so long as a core component of the 
LRA remains in the bush and the peace has not been finalized, mato 
oput may not be able to foster sustainable peace.187 Also, the ongoing 
conflict has largely caused a persistent lack of resources, which has 
posed a major obstacle to the completion of mato oput in northern 
Uganda.188 The offending parties have not been able to pay compen-
sation because people living in displacement camps do not have ac-
cess to income and cannot raise the funds as their family or clan 
members usually suffer from the same levels of poverty.189 
 A final challenge is that the ethnic identity of the perpetrators in 
this conflict, as well as their willingness to reconcile, will significantly 
affect mato oput’s applicability.190 UPDF perpetrators come from differ-
ent ethnic groups throughout Uganda and their crimes fall under 
separate Ugandan legislation to which traditional justice does not ap-
ply, unless they are Acholi.191 The UPDF’s role in this conflict also sig-
nificantly complicates the reconciliation process because the peaceful 
settlement of this conflict through mato oput would require the Ugan-
dan government to acknowledge the offenses committed by the Ugan-
dan army.192 Reconciliation through mato oput would therefore depend 
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on the willingness of high-ranking UPDF, as well as LRA, leaders to ad-
mit responsibility for offenses which they ordered or committed them-
selves.193 Meanwhile, the ethnic identity of LRA perpetrators poses its 
own problems.194 Because the LRA has abducted children from 
neighboring districts with different ethnic groups, some of the LRA 
perpetrators in this conflict are non-Acholi who may hold different cul-
tural beliefs which do not include mato oput.195 
 Altogether, these problems suggest that traditional chiefs would 
have to educate the Acholi population about these ceremonies and also 
adapt them to the present circumstances. These challenges are not 
necessarily insurmountable, but they do indicate that other non-
traditional mechanisms may be necessary in guiding the reconciliation 
process among the Acholi. The following section examines alternative 
mechanisms which Uganda could implement to assist in its transition 
from conflict to peace. 
III. Alternative Transitional Mechanisms Which  
Uganda Could Implement 
 This section looks to the experiences of other post-conflict African 
states and explores alternative transitional mechanisms which the gov-
ernment of Uganda could pursue to promote peace and reconciliation 
in the region. This article proceeds under the assumption that other 
mechanisms are necessary in Uganda because the amnesty and tradi-
tional justice and reconciliation mechanisms are insufficient by them-
selves.196 With only the amnesty and the traditional mechanisms in place, 
unrealistic demands of forgiveness may be placed on victims who may 
never receive compensation or an acknowledgment of guilt from perpe-
trators. While the Amnesty Act currently does not offer reparations for 
victims, or foster a dialogue, or truth-telling process, the traditional 
mechanisms also have not, as of yet, begun to foster those processes in a 
robust way.197 The following discusses the approaches previously taken in 
Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Rwanda, and then explains 
how truth-telling and compensation could play important roles in pro-
moting peace and reconciliation in northern Uganda. 
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A. Truth-Telling Process 
 In a post-conflict northern Uganda, a truth commission could 
play a critical role in the region’s transition from civil war to peace. 
Despite the often inherently difficult and controversial nature of truth 
commissions, as well as the checkered history of past truth commis-
sions in Uganda, many of the basic goals of truth commissions would 
be particularly applicable in Uganda today.198 In addition, the specific 
features of this conflict would heighten the potential utility of a 
Ugandan truth commission. Commentators, as well as local leaders, 
appear to have widely overestimated the Acholi capacity to forgive the 
perpetrators of this conflict, who range from abducted children to 
UPDF soldiers to LRA rebels.199 Neither the amnesty process nor the 
traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms adequately respond 
to these realities in northern Uganda. 
 A discussion of the merits of a Ugandan truth commission first 
warrants a brief sketch of what the basic features of such a commission 
might be. After the conflict is officially over, a Ugandan truth commis-
sion would investigate abuses by both the LRA and UPDF in northern 
Uganda from the time President Museveni came to power in 1986 up 
until the present day.200 The government of Uganda would officially 
sanction this commission, which would operate for a relatively short 
amount of time, such as two years, after which the commission would 
produce a report.201 If the Ugandan Parliament were to leave the Am-
nesty Act untouched, then amnesty would not be formally linked to the 
truth-telling process as it was in South Africa.202 A Ugandan commis-
sion could potentially be given the power to grant amnesty based on 
the testimony of individuals before the commission, however, which 
might encourage more perpetrators to participate in the truth commis-
sion.203 Presumably this commission could successfully operate parallel 
to the ICC, as was the case in Sierra Leone, where the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (Special Court) and the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
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mission (TRC) existed side by side.204 Ideally, a Ugandan commission 
would function as a central component of northern Uganda’s transi-
tion from civil war to peace, alongside, though not necessarily in con-
junction with, the amnesty process and trials at the ICC.205 
1. Reasons Why Uganda Should Have a Truth Commission 
 Both the process and the product of a truth commission in 
Uganda could play an important role in Uganda’s transition for a wide 
range of reasons. First, a truth commission would promote sanctioned 
fact finding by discovering, clarifying, and formally acknowledging the 
atrocities and abuses which have taken place in northern Uganda for 
over two decades.206 Interviews with victims would allow for a detailed 
accounting of the conflict in the region over the course of this pe-
riod.207 According to Priscilla Hayner, “[t]he detail and breadth of in-
formation in a truth commission report is usually of a kind and quality 
far better than any previous historical account, leaving the country with 
a written and well-documented record of otherwise oft-disputed 
events.”208 
 Second, a truth commission would respond to the needs of vic-
tims in northern Uganda.209 Without a truth-telling mechanism in 
Uganda, the amnesty process could place unrealistic demands on vic-
tims and unnecessarily sacrifice the truth for peace.210 Unlike criminal 
prosecutions, such as those at the ICC, the primary focus of a Ugan-
dan truth commission would be on the victims rather than on the 
specific acts of the perpetrators.211 By taking the testimony of victims 
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and witnesses, holding public hearings, and publishing a report, the 
commission would provide victims with a public voice.212 It would also 
be possible for a truth commission to serve victims’ needs through a 
reparations program.213 Additionally, the Acholi population appears 
to desire a truth commission even though many Acholi victims may 
already know the truth about what happened and who was responsi-
ble.214 A survey by the International Center for Transitional Justice 
reveals that the population of northern Uganda would, in fact, be 
overwhelmingly in favor of a truth-telling process.215 While only 
twenty-eight percent were aware of the existence of truth commissions 
in other countries, such as in Sierra Leone and South Africa, ninety-
two percent said that Uganda needed a truth-telling process.216 Fur-
thermore, eighty-four percent said that the population of northern 
Uganda should remember the legacy of past abuses.217 Although the 
population already desires a truth-telling process, a formal process is 
necessary because people fear openly discussing the war and experi-
ence shame in association with the atrocities that have taken place.218 
Thus, while a truth commission would not necessarily provide victims 
in northern Uganda with a “new truth,” it could still play a valuable 
role by creating a forum for such truth-telling, and by “formally rec-
ogniz[ing] a truth they may already . . . know.”219 
 Finally, a truth commission could play an important role in 
Uganda by outlining the responsibility of the government of Uganda 
for the long-lasting nature of the conflict and for the abuses of the 
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UPDF.220 The commission could then recommend reforms, most likely 
for the military and the police.221 A truth commission would be well-
positioned to undertake such an assessment because of its status as an 
institution independent of those under review and because of its ability 
to base its assessment on a detailed, well-developed record.222 While the 
commission’s recommendations for reform would likely not be manda-
tory, they could still provide useful guidance for change, depending on 
the political will of the Museveni government and the pressure applied 
by the international community.223 Such an assessment and prescrip-
tion could play a critical role in Uganda’s transition given the allegedly 
widespread abuses by UPDF forces and the relative impunity they have 
enjoyed.224 As mentioned above, UPDF soldiers have reportedly raped 
women and girls, committed extrajudicial execution and torture, re-
cruited former LRA child soldiers into the UPDF, and forcibly dis-
placed civilians for reasons linked to the conflict.225 Yet UPDF forces 
have not been held accountable for these atrocities to any significant 
extent by the government of Uganda.226 In addition, the ICC chose to 
issue arrest warrants only for the top leaders of the LRA, despite the 
well-known abuses of the UPDF.227 While these UPDF perpetrators will 
most likely never face criminal prosecutions, national or international, 
the government of Uganda could at a minimum engage in security sec-
tor reform to promote a sustainable peace in northern Uganda.228 A 
truth commission would be uniquely well-positioned to point Uganda 
in the direction of such reform. 
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2. Potential Problems Facing a Ugandan Truth Commission 
 Any thorough exploration of a possible truth commission in 
Uganda should mention the potential pitfalls, especially given that a 
truth commission in Uganda would most likely co-exist beside an am-
nesty process as well as ICC trials in The Hague.229 Additionally, as 
Hayner writes: 
The task of these truth bodies will never be easy. Truth com-
missions are difficult and controversial entities; they are given a 
mammoth, almost impossible task and usually insufficient time 
and resources to complete it; they must struggle with rampant 
lies, denials, and deceit and the painful, almost unspeakable 
memories of victims to uncover still-dangerous truths that many 
in power may well continue to resist.230 
Not only have two prior truth commissions in Uganda encountered se-
rious problems, but the TRC in Sierra Leone has met with its own share 
of difficulties, as well as successes.231 The following therefore touches 
upon the challenges faced by these commissions in Uganda and Sierra 
Leone, with a view to how a Ugandan truth commission might structure 
itself to avoid or to deal with such challenges. 
a. The Experiences of Prior Truth Commissions in Uganda 
 In June 1974, President Idi Amin Dada established the Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda in re-
sponse to pressure to investigate disappearances effected by Ugandan 
military forces since he came into power in January 1971.232 The 
Commission consisted of a Pakistani judge as the chair, two Ugandan 
police superintendents, and a Ugandan army officer.233 Although the 
Commission’s powers allowed it to compel witness testimony and to call 
for the production of evidence, many government sectors, including 
the military police and intelligence, blocked access to information on 
the disappearances.234 The Commission held hearings, which were 
generally public, during which it heard the testimony of 545 witnesses 
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and documented 308 disappearances.235 Though the Commission criti-
cized the government of Amin, assigned responsibility for the abuses, 
and issued recommendations for reform of the police and security 
forces, the Commission had little impact on the abusiveness of Amin’s 
forces, because little commitment to change accompanied the estab-
lishment of the Commission.236 Unsurprisingly, President Amin neither 
published the report nor implemented its recommendations.237 Al-
though this exercise in truth-telling was quite insincere, it is nonethe-
less widely considered to have been a truth commission, however un-
successful.238 
 By contrast to the 1974 Commission, the 1986 Commission took 
place as part of a political transition in Uganda.239 Soon after President 
Museveni came into power in January 1986, he appointed a Commis-
sion of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights to investigate human 
rights violations by state forces from the time of Uganda’s independ-
ence in 1962 to Museveni’s overthrow of the government in 1986.240 
Through public hearings and live television and radio broadcasts, the 
Commission initially “attrac[ted] wide popular support and an emo-
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tional reaction from the public.”241 The Commission, however, suffered 
from an absence of political will as well as institutional failures, includ-
ing a limited capacity to manage its very broad and unwieldy mandate, 
a lack of funding and resources, and a lack of time.242 In addition, 
northern Ugandan participation in the Commission was extremely lim-
ited as rebel activity in the area made travel to the region difficult if not 
impossible; five years into its public hearings, the Commission spent 
only four days in the north.243 Also, the Commission operated without a 
deadline for completion, and finally submitted its report in 1994, after 
eight years of investigation.244 By this time the public had lost interest 
in the Commission, as new abuses, not covered by the Commission had 
taken place under the Museveni government, and the report and 
summary were reportedly never distributed, though thousands of cop-
ies were published.245 Both within and outside of Uganda, the work of 
this Commission has been virtually forgotten.246 Finally, the Amnesty 
Commission, the possibility of which was publicly discussed during the 
period in which the Commission of Inquiry was in existence, may have 
undermined the Commission by eliminating culpability and negating 
the need to investigate the truth about the past.247 
 These two commissions point both to the need for a successful 
Ugandan truth commission, and to the problems which could befall yet 
another attempt at a truth-telling process in Uganda.248 Beyond the 
issue of limited public awareness among Ugandans of the 1986 Truth 
Commission, the highly limited participation of northern Ugandans in 
that Commission suggests that a truth-telling process virtually never 
even took place in the north.249 Additionally, to the very limited degree 
that northern Ugandans did participate, the Commission, according to 
its mandate, focused on abuses prior to 1986, before the LRA had even 
come into existence.250 Moreover, to the extent that today’s Amnesty 
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Commission now effectively buries the past instead of illuminating it, 
another truth commission in Uganda would bring much needed public 
awareness to the conflict endured by northern Ugandans.251 Given the 
checkered history of truth commissions in Uganda, however, another 
commission would require careful planning so as to ensure that Presi-
dent Museveni’s second truth commission would not suffer from the 
same problems which undermined the 1986 Commission.252 This com-
mission would require a deadline for completion as well as a carefully 
circumscribed mandate.253 The international community would most 
likely have to play a critical role, not only by providing financial sup-
port, but also by pressuring President Museveni to throw his political 
will behind the commission, without which history suggests the com-
mission would be doomed to fail.254 
b. The Co-existence of Sierra Leone’s Special Court and Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission 
 The co-existence in Sierra Leone of the TRC and Special Court is 
especially relevant for northern Uganda because a truth commission in 
Uganda could conceivably operate contemporaneously with trials at the 
ICC in The Hague.255 Given that post-conflict States have traditionally 
instituted truth commissions as an alternative to criminal justice, 
thereby replacing or at least suspending criminal prosecutions, Sierra 
Leone’s mixture of these two options represents a unique and un-
precedented experiment.256 Ultimately, Sierra Leone’s experiment in 
transitional justice demonstrates some of the tensions between the two 
mechanisms as well as the feasibility of their coexistence.257 The follow-
ing briefly outlines the key features of the TRC and Special Court, and 
discusses the particularly notable aspects of their largely successful rela-
tionship. 
 The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement marked the beginning of the 
end of the conflict in Sierra Leone.258 The Agreement provided for 
the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission “to address im-
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punity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the vic-
tims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, 
[and to] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine 
healing and reconciliation.”259 The TRC exercised temporal jurisdic-
tion over human rights violations from the beginning of the conflict 
on March 23, 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 
July 7, 1999.260 It had the authority to recommend measures for the 
rehabilitation of victims and to make recommendations regarding the 
Special Fund for War Victims.261 The TRC was mandated to give spe-
cial attention to the experiences of children in the conflict.262 
 While the success of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission originally inspired the establishment of Sierra Leone’s 
Commission, it did not have the same power held by the South African 
Commission to grant amnesty as an incentive for admissions by perpe-
trators.263 Instead, the Lomé Peace Agreement provided for a blanket 
amnesty for the acts of all combatants and collaborators up to the sign-
ing of the Agreement.264 Upon the signing of the Lomé Agreement 
however, the U.N. Special Representative entered a reservation stipulat-
ing that the United Nations did not recognize the application of am-
nesty to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law.265 
 The government of Sierra Leone later requested that the United 
Nations establish a special tribunal after renewed fighting in May 2000 
resulted in a reassessment of the amnesty provided by the Lomé Agree-
ment.266 The United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone then 
reached an agreement establishing the Special Court, which would be 
composed of both national and international judges who would apply 
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international as well as Sierra Leonean law. 267 The Special Court is au-
thorized “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 
1996.”268 Despite intense speculation about how the Special Court and 
the TRC would interact, the two institutions never came to any formal 
agreement on cooperation between them, but instead seemed to value 
polite and neighborly relations and nothing more. 269 
 In mid-2002 both the Special Court and the TRC began their op-
erations in Freetown in buildings, coincidentally, neighboring each 
other.270 In March 2003, the Court began to issue what would amount to 
a total of thirteen indictments for high profile individuals associated 
with all three warring factions.271 Trials at the Special Court did not be-
gin until June 2004, at which point the TRC’s work was nearly com-
plete.272 During the statement-taking phase, which began in December 
2002, the TRC interviewed approximately seven-thousand victims and 
perpetrators throughout the country.273 It then held public hearings 
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throughout Sierra Leone between March and August 2003 and pre-
sented its final report in October 2004, by which time the TRC and the 
Special Court had been operating simultaneously for over 18 months.274 
 When the two bodies began their work, a major concern emerged 
that because of their overlapping mandates and jurisdictions, the two 
institutions would conflict with each other, confuse the Sierra Leonean 
public, and waste resources by duplicating each other’s work.275 The 
subject matter jurisdiction of the TRC encompassed, and went beyond, 
that of the Special Court, while the temporal jurisdiction of the two in-
stitutions overlapped from November 30, 1996 to July 7, 1999.276 Wil-
liam Schabas, one of the TRC commissioners, argues that concerns 
about overlapping mandates and jurisdictions did not actually play out 
in any significant way.277 Their day-to-day work shared little common 
ground and the two institutions demonstrated that they could work 
side-by-side without conflict or tension.278 Schabas further posits that, 
“[g]iven an appropriately benign and non-confrontational attitude of 
the personalities involved, there is no reason why this experience can-
not be repeated in other contexts,” as potential sources of conflict can 
be managed.279 Schabas also suggests that although many Sierra 
Leoneans did not appreciate the distinction between the TRC and Spe-
cial Court, as long as they simply understood that both institutions were 
working towards accountability for the atrocities suffered during the 
war, then perhaps a failure to grasp the distinctions between the two 
really did not represent a significant problem.280 
 The initial debate about the relationship between the two bodies 
was also dominated by the concern that information sharing by the 
TRC with the Special Court would deter perpetrators from telling the 
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truth or from even attending the TRC out of fear that such evidence 
would be used against them by the Special Court.281 The TRC, how-
ever, insisted that it would not share confidential information with the 
Special Court, and the Special Court Prosecutor David Crane publicly 
stated that the Court would not use evidence presented to the TRC.282 
According to one commentator, some Sierra Leoneans were neverthe-
less suspicious of information exchanges between the two institutions 
and refrained from giving statements to the TRC to avoid incriminat-
ing themselves.283 Another commentator even argues that perhaps the 
TRC should not have begun to function until after the Special Court 
had finished its work so that witnesses would not fear that revealing 
admissions would lead to prosecution by the Court.284 
 Schabas, on the other hand, argues that it is difficult to assess how 
such concerns about information sharing actually affected the work of 
the TRC, as the willingness of perpetrators to participate in account-
ability processes, such as truth-telling has little to do with the threat of 
criminal trials or the promise of amnesty.285 Instead, “[w]illingness or 
unwillingness to testify seems to have more to do with the mysteries of 
the human soul than it does with issues of amnesty, use immunity and 
compulsion to testify.”286 While only small numbers of perpetrators tes-
tified before the TRC, other truth commissions that functioned with no 
threat of prosecution were no more successful in persuading perpetra-
tors to testify.287 In fact, several detainees of the Special Court—Sam 
Hinga Norman, Augustine Gbao, and Issa Sesay—actually approached 
the TRC about giving public testimony before it, thereby suggesting 
that the threat of prosecution played a relatively insignificant role in 
discouraging testimony before the TRC.288 Ironically, these requests to 
testify provoked the only public tension between the two bodies during 
their co-existence.289 The Prosecutor of the Special Court opposed pub-
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lic hearings for these three detainees, and a ruling on appeal by the 
Court’s President, Geoffrey Robertson, allowed the defendants to testify 
before the TRC, but not in public.290 Defendant Norman then refused 
to cooperate with the TRC after having been deprived of his public 
platform.291 Schabas describes this as a most unfortunate quarrel be-
tween the two institutions at the close of what had been an essentially 
“cordial and uneventful relationship.”292 
 Sierra Leone’s experiment demonstrates that the co-existence of a 
Ugandan truth commission and ICC trials would be a feasible and even 
desirable combination of transitional justice mechanisms.293 Like the 
TRC in Sierra Leone, a Ugandan truth commission could focus on the 
needs of children and of victims, more generally. The conflicts in Sierra 
Leone and northern Uganda are similar in that both involved the large-
scale use of child soldiers as well as massive population displacement.294 
Neither the Special Court nor the ICC, however, can effectively play a 
significant role in addressing these realities, as both courts necessarily 
focus on a relatively very small number of perpetrators, not on the very 
large number of victims.295 Such a highly selective focus on the actions 
of a few perpetrators is, of course, in the very nature of international 
criminal justice.296 The massive scale of these conflicts essentially de-
mands a complementary mechanism, however, which addresses the 
needs of victims, including the need to hear and tell the truth. The 
ICC’s outreach program and its plans for victim participation do not 
provide a substitute for a truth commission.297 The outreach program 
logically consists primarily of the Court informing Ugandans about the 
Court, not of Ugandan victims informing the Court about the atrocities 
they have suffered.298 Also, although the Rome Statute does include 
unprecedented provisions for the participation of victims in the Court’s 
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proceedings, the narrowly confined nature of this participation does 
not resemble that of a truth commission at all.299 
 In addition, a mixture of truth-telling and criminal justice for 
northern Uganda could meet with fewer challenges than did Sierra 
Leone’s simultaneous pursuit of these two approaches.300 First, a tem-
poral, as well as a physical, separation between the ICC and a commis-
sion would help to separate the two institutions in the minds of Ugan-
dans to a greater extent than was the case in Sierra Leone.301 Ugandans 
would probably not be as likely to confuse or conflate the two institu-
tions because the ICC’s investigation and issuance of arrest warrants 
would have occurred years before the creation of a truth commis-
sion.302 In Sierra Leone, by contrast, the Commission and the Court 
began to operate at approximately the same time. Given that the ICC 
resides in The Hague, while the truth commission would operate in 
Uganda, the ICC and the commission would not literally be neighbors, 
as the Special Court and TRC were in Freetown. Second, Uganda’s 
combination of truth telling and criminal justice may be less problem-
atic than in Sierra Leone, because perpetrators might be less con-
cerned about information sharing between a commission and the ICC 
because the ICC has already issued its indictments in the Uganda situa-
tion.303 Leaving aside the unlikely possibility that the ICC will issue fur-
ther arrest warrants years after unsealing the first warrants, perpetrators 
would not be faced with fears about future prosecutions based on their 
testimony before the commission.304 
 Finally, in contrast to the TRC in Sierra Leone, a commission in 
Uganda would be less likely to face severe under-funding because the 
ICC and the commission would not be in direct competition with each 
other for funding as were the Special Court and the Commission.305 
Because the ICC obtains its funding through the contributions of States 
parties as well as the United Nations, the commission would be drawing 
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upon a separate pool of money from the international donor commu-
nity.306 
B. A Reparations System 
 The range of physical, psychological, and socio-economic harm 
suffered by northern Ugandans as a result of this twenty-two year con-
flict with the LRA necessitates the provision of reparations by the gov-
ernment.307 The LRA has killed and mutilated civilians and abducted 
tens of thousands of children and adults, while the UPDF has commit-
ted its own share of atrocities.308 The conflict has produced approxi-
mately 1.7 million IDPs who have little prospect of employment, health 
care, education, or returning home.309 Meanwhile, an untenable situa-
tion has developed wherein perpetrators who have been granted am-
nesty have received resettlement packages while victims have received 
nothing.310 According to the International Center for Transitional Jus-
tice, a majority of those surveyed said that victims of the conflict should 
receive some form of reparations.311 Fifty-two percent wanted victims to 
receive financial compensation and fifty-eight percent thought that 
such compensation should be for the community as opposed to indi-
vidual victims.312 While a majority (sixty-three percent) of respondents 
believed that the return of IDPs to their villages should be prioritized 
once peace is achieved, respondents also gave priority to rebuilding 
village infrastructure (twenty-nine percent), providing compensation to 
victims (twenty-two percent), and providing education to children 
(twenty-one percent).313 In this context, reparations could encompass 
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an expansive definition, including restitution (the restoration of the 
victim to the original situation before the violations occurred), com-
pensation (for economically assessable damage), rehabilitation (medi-
cal and psychological care and legal and social services), and satisfac-
tion and guarantees of non-repetition (to acknowledge the violations 
and prevent their recurrence).314 
 The government of Uganda, however, has failed to respond to vic-
tims’ need for reparations. Neither the Amnesty Act nor the traditional 
justice and reconciliation mechanisms currently provide victims with 
significant compensation.315 The Amnesty Act, in fact, provides no 
reparations for victims but instead provides the perpetrators with reset-
tlement packages.316 Although mato oput is traditionally supposed to 
include compensation in the form of cattle or money, such payments 
may no longer be possible because the vast majority of the Acholi popu-
lation now lives in poverty in IDP camps.317 In addition, former LRA 
rebels typically escape from the bush with no ability to offer any com-
pensation themselves.318 Consequently, this article proposes that the 
government of Uganda could compensate the victims through the 
Amnesty Commission or by funding the compensation mechanism em-
bodied in mato oput. Alternatively, if the government of Uganda were to 
establish a truth commission, then reparations could be provided 
through this institution as well. 
 The reparations systems of South Africa and Rwanda may provide 
models for Uganda’s post conflict situation. South Africa provides an 
example of how compensation may be tied to a larger truth commis-
sion, while Rwanda’s gacaca tribunals alternatively show how a tradi-
tional justice mechanism may be codified and expanded to include 
compensation.319 In post-conflict northern Uganda, a compensation 
system similar to that of South Africa or Rwanda could work toward 
adequately addressing victims’ interests. 
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1. South Africa’s Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation 
 South Africa’s TRC included a Committee on Reparations and 
Rehabilitation that recommended symbolic reparations as well as sub-
stantial payments to victims of gross human rights violations.320 When 
the Committee began its work in 1996, many South Africans expected 
that compensation would be only symbolic because of the vast number 
of claims and the difficulties involved in adequately compensating vic-
tims.321 The Committee, however, shifted its emphasis from symbolic to 
substantial compensation after conducting workshops throughout 
South Africa over two years.322 While the Committee did propose sym-
bolic reparations, including memorials, reburials, renaming of streets, 
and days of remembrance, it also proposed individual reparation 
grants.323 In addition, the Committee determined that certain victims 
required urgent interim relief, including victims who had lost a wage-
earner, who required psychological support after testifying, who re-
quired urgent medical attention, or who were terminally ill and not 
expected to outlive the South African TRC.324 
 Despite these substantial recommendations by the Committee, the 
reparations process in South Africa has generated significant dissatis-
faction among victims.325 First, the government was very slow to re-
spond to the South African TRC’s recommendations about payments to 
the 22,000 victims.326 Second, the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, which authorized the South African TRC, included 
no requirements for reparations from perpetrators or beneficiaries of 
apartheid.327 The Act did not call for reparations directly from perpe-
trators to victims even though under traditional systems, ubuntu, an Af-
rican philosophy of humanity, requires ulihlawule, paying the debt, by 
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the one who violates community law.328 The Act thus broke this link 
between the violation and the obligation.329 
2. Reparations Through Rwanda’s Gacaca Tribunals 
 Rwanda, by contrast, developed a compensation system linked not 
to a truth and reconciliation commission, but to its gacaca system.330 
Rwanda’s gacaca tribunals grew out of the government’s struggle to de-
tain and prosecute over 100,000 people charged with the commission 
of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity during the 1994 
Rwandan genocide.331 However, because of the modest prosecution 
rates of both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
and the national judiciary, by 2000 the Rwandan government had be-
gun to seek an alternative form of justice.332 According to Chiseche 
Mibenge: 
There was an emphasis on establishing a model of justice that 
would embrace traditional Rwandan values by advocating res-
toration over retribution; a model that would expedite the 
process of justice, ease overcrowding in detention centres and 
uphold the rights of the accused while remaining palatable to 
the survivors of the genocide. Gacaca tribunals emerged as the 
only viable solution to the impasse in Rwanda’s domestic tran-
sitional justice process.333 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Law of 2001 therefore codified a modified version of 
Rwanda’s traditional community-based dispute resolution mechanism 
whereby village elders would assemble all parties to a dispute in order 
to mediate a solution.334 The Gacaca Law of 2001 designed a participa-
tory judicial system that would involve a large part of the Rwandan 
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population as judges or witnesses.335 While the gacaca typically dealt 
with disputes over property rights, livestock, marriage, succession, and 
attacks on personal integrity, the Gacaca Law of 2001 established gacaca 
tribunals for the prosecutions of genocide and crimes against humanity 
committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.336 Addi-
tionally, the Gacaca Law of 2004, which amended the earlier Law of 
2001, created three categories for prosecuted persons based on the 
gravity of their crime.337 Gacaca tribunals exercise jurisdiction over the 
lesser category two and three offenses, which include crimes against the 
person and crimes against property.338 
 The unusual nature of the gacaca tribunals compelled the Rwan-
dan legislature to clarify the extent to which the tribunals could render 
decisions concerning compensation.339 While the Gacaca Law of 2001 
provided for a compensation fund, the Gacaca Law of 2004, which now 
prevails over the 2001 Law in this respect, contains significantly differ-
ent provisions for compensation.340 Under the Gacaca Law of 2001, the 
rulings and judgments of the gacaca tribunals included lists of victims, 
the damages they suffered, and the compensation to which they were 
entitled.341 The gacaca tribunals would then forward rulings and judg-
ments, with these lists, to the Compensation Fund for Victims of the 
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, which would make pay-
ments.342 Based on total damages suffered, the Fund would then fix the 
modalities for granting compensation.343 
                                                                                                                      
335 See Mibenge, supra note 330, at 412; Vandeginste, supra note 319, at 258, 260. 
336 Mibenge, supra note 330, at 413. 
337 Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence 
and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of 
the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 
1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, art. 51, available at www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlaw1. 
pdf [hereinafter Gacaca Law 2004]. 
338 Art. 2. Gacaca tribunals do not however exercise jurisdiction over the most serious 
offenses or perpetrators, which compose category one offenses. Arts. 2, 51. 
339 See Vandeginste, supra note 319, at 258. 
340 See Gacaca Law 2004, supra note 337, arts. 95–96; Gacaca Law 2001, supra note 334, 
arts. 90–91. 
341 Gacaca Law 2001, supra note 334, art. 90. These rulings must indicate “the identity 
of persons who have suffered material losses and the inventory of damages to their prop-
erty; the list of victims and the inventory of suffered body damages; as well as related dam-
ages fixed in conformity with the scale provided for by law.” Id. 
342 See id. The Compensation Fund is distinct from the National Fund for Assistance to 
Survivors of Genocide and Massacres (NFASGM), which came into existence in 1998. 
Vandeginste, supra note 319, at 264. The NFASGM provides assistance to the most eco-
nomically disadvantaged victims. See id. Its activities focus on housing, education, health, 
and social reintegration. Id. 
343 Gacaca Law 2001, supra note 334, art. 90. 
390 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:345
  
 By contrast, the Gacaca Law of 2004 contains narrower provisions 
for compensation which largely avoid the issue of damages or other 
forms of compensation.344 Under this law, reparations only involve the 
“restitution of the property looted whenever possible” and “repayment 
of the ransacked property or carrying out the work worth the property 
to be repaired.”345 In addition, “[o]ther forms of compensation the vic-
tims receive shall be determined [only] by a particular law,” a reference 
to the Fond d’Indemnisation (FIND)—draft legislation concerning a 
victims compensation fund.346 Consequently, until FIND becomes law, 
the Gacaca Law of 2004 has effectively reduced the scope of damages 
which victims may receive because the law covers only property dam-
ages, not bodily harm.347 
 Although the compensation provisions of the Gacaca Law of 2004 
now prevail over the more robust provisions of Gacaca Law of 2001, the 
advantages and risks of the earlier Law are more relevant for our pur-
poses because the 2001 Law more adequately addresses victims’ inter-
ests and therefore provides a more suitable model for a reparations sys-
tem in Uganda.348 According to Stef Vandeginste, some of the 
advantages of the Gacaca Law of 2001 included: 
the active participation of the victims, the acknowledgment of 
their status as victims, the recognition of the damages they have 
incurred, the acknowledgment of their right to reparation in-
dependent of any sentencing of the perpetrator of a crime, the 
consistency and realism in the sums awarded, and the more 
than merely symbolic value of the amounts concerned.349 
Additionally, the law entitled victims to receive compensation without 
a criminal conviction of the perpetrator, thus eliminating the role of 
criminal evidence in the determination of compensation.350 
 Potentially problematic aspects of this system, however, included its 
dependence on the transparent, proper operation and financial 
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wherewithal of the Compensation Fund.351 Also, claimants still encoun-
tered difficulties in proving damages, such as through the provision of 
medical certificates, so many years after the genocide.352 Finally, raising 
awareness of the gacaca tribunals and of the Fund among the most ill-
informed and destitute victims also posed a great challenge to the 
Gacaca Law of 2001.353 The advantages and risks of the reparations sys-
tem created by the Gacaca Law of 2001 are most likely not specific to 
Rwanda’s gacaca system and could easily characterize a reparations sys-
tem linked to traditional Acholi mechanisms as well. 
3. Reparations in Uganda 
 Uganda faces many potential alternatives for a reparations system. 
The government could implement reparations through a stand-alone 
government agency or through another mechanism such as a truth 
commission, the Amnesty Commission, or mato oput. While the experi-
ences of both South Africa and Rwanda are relevant for northern 
Uganda, the following discussion focuses on the pertinence of 
Rwanda’s gacaca system, which is perhaps most immediately relevant, as 
traditional mechanisms currently exist in northern Uganda but, as of 
yet, no truth commission has come into being.354 Although Uganda will 
very likely not implement the equivalent of Rwanda’s gacaca tribunals, 
the compensation system set forth in the Gacaca Law of 2001 could still 
be relevant to the victims of the conflict in northern Uganda.355 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Law of 2001 demonstrates how government-funded 
compensation can take place through traditional justice mechanisms, 
as opposed to a truth commission.356 
 It is possible that the Amnesty Commission could implement a 
reparations system tied to mato oput.357 The government of Uganda 
could strengthen this traditional mechanism by pledging to provide 
the funds for the compensation upon which the parties have agreed. 
The Amnesty Commission could establish a compensation fund under 
its power to “perform any other function that is associated or con-
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nected with the execution of the functions stipulated in [the] Act.”358 
Because the Commission’s functions include the promotion of recon-
ciliation, a compensation fund would be a permissible expansion of 
the Commission’s current operations.359 The two parties performing 
mato oput could agree upon an appropriate level of compensation and 
then submit a claim to the compensation fund.360 The Commission 
could issue guidelines for parties to use when determining appropri-
ate levels of compensation. Such a system could restore efficacy to 
mato oput, which is currently somewhat dysfunctional partly due to the 
inability of perpetrators to provide compensation.361 
 Some caveats, however, are in order. This compensation system 
would, of course, be premised on a general revival of mato oput and its 
use by LRA perpetrators and their victims, neither of which may actu-
ally happen.362 Also, third-party interference by the government in the 
mato oput process could conceivably harm the integrity of a process that 
has traditionally taken place between clans with no government in-
volvement. Given these potential problems, the Amnesty Commission 
could, alternatively, provide benefits to victims who apply to receive 
compensation packages, which could be similar to the resettlement 
packages given to reporters.363 Thus, the provision of reparations by the 
Amnesty Commission could exist totally apart from mato oput. 
 Finally, Rwanda also serves as a useful example of how broad pov-
erty reduction, in addition to compensation for individual victims or 
clans, may contribute to reconciliation.364 Poverty reduction is one of 
the priorities of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led government, as 
President Paul Kagame has reiterated in public statements.365 For 
Rwandans whose livelihood was destroyed during the genocide, eco-
nomic assistance may lay the groundwork necessary for the process of 
forgiveness and reconciliation.366 Similarly, in northern Uganda, com-
pensation for whole communities could also play an important role in 
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helping the region achieve reconciliation.367 The government could 
focus on providing the infrastructure necessary for the Acholi people 
to achieve reintegration because northern Ugandans cannot truly rein-
tegrate the former rebels until they have left the IDP camps and re-
turned to their homes.368 Communal compensation could therefore 
concentrate on rebuilding infrastructure, resettlement packages for 
farming, and resources for education.369 
 Measures aimed at broader poverty reduction, beyond support for 
reintegration, could also be an important tool for achieving national as 
well as regional reconciliation.370 The International Crisis Group writes 
of how the north-south divide in Uganda must be bridged so that the 
Acholi feel that they are a part of Ugandan society.371 Unifying the 
country “will require specific political, economic and social initiatives 
aimed at building the North’s connections with the central government 
while enhancing autonomy and localized decision-making.”372 Such 
initiatives could include post-conflict reconstruction assistance through 
“support for agricultural production,” affirmative action through 
scholarships and employment opportunities, “social reform,” “settle-
ment and reintegration of IDPs,” and “psychological and social sup-
port” for former LRA rebels and victimized communities.373 
IV. International Criminal Justice 
 The final section of this article examines the degree to which the 
ICC may be able to play a role in fostering reconciliation in northern 
Uganda, particularly in light of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.374 
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The experience of the Special Court is highly relevant to the situation 
in northern Uganda because the Special Court has narrowly focused 
on prosecuting only those bearing the greatest responsibility for the 
civil war in Sierra Leone.375 In June 2000, Sierra Leone’s President 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah requested the assistance of the international 
community in establishing a court to try high level Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) officers.376 Having taken RUF leader Foday 
Sankoh into custody in May 2000, the government was apprehensive 
that a national trial of Sankoh and other RUF leaders would aggravate 
the conflict and produce further instability.377 By January 2002, the 
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations had concluded 
the Agreement on the Special Court, which established a hybrid tri-
bunal based in Freetown.378 
 The Special Court’s statute limits the Court’s prosecutorial scope 
to only those “who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law” committed 
during the conflict.379 The Court’s limited prosecutorial discretion en-
abled the Court to keep its time frame relatively short and its costs rela-
tively low, as compared with the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia.380 The Court only indicted thirteen persons, and ten 
arrests resulted, including that of former Liberian President Charles 
Taylor in March 2006.381 While questions linger about whether such 
limited prosecutions will produce incomplete or unsatisfactory justice 
in Sierra Leone, the prosecution of Charles Taylor will likely have a 
highly significant impact on the Court’s ultimate credibility as well as 
Sierra Leonean perceptions of the Court.382 
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone is relevant to northern Uganda 
because limited prosecutions of the LRA by the ICC are currently the 
only practicable and available options for Uganda, though they may be 
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undesirable.383 In post-conflict northern Uganda, the widespread use of 
retributive justice would not be an effective tool for achieving recon-
ciliation.384 Many argue that justice can theoretically deter similar acts 
in the future by ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of 
law.385 In fact, “[t]he basic argument in support of prosecutions is that 
trials are necessary in order to bring violators of human rights to justice 
and to deter future repression.”386 Yet prolonged trials of all or most of 
the Ugandan perpetrators on the scale of those in Rwanda—through 
ordinary domestic courts, the gacaca tribunals, and the ICTR—would 
be inappropriate in northern Uganda for a number of reasons. 
 First, on a pragmatic level, northern Uganda could not accommo-
date mass prosecutions of former LRA rebels.387 Northern Uganda cur-
rently lacks the infrastructure necessary to conduct trials for UPDF sol-
diers, let alone thousands of former LRA rebels.388 The courts are 
grossly understaffed and little or no judicial presence exists in the Kit-
gum and Pader districts.389 As of March 2005, a large backlog of cases, 
two to three years old, existed in Gulu because no High Court judge 
had sat in Gulu in more than five months.390 Thus the judiciary’s capac-
ity to guarantee fair trials is very limited and the resources necessary to 
rebuild the judiciary and to support mass justice in the Acholi region 
could perhaps be better spent on other initiatives geared more directly 
towards reconciliation.391 
 Second, even a less expensive, mass justice system such as the 
gacaca tribunals in Rwanda would be inappropriate for northern 
Uganda because of the circumstances of this conflict.392 Trials would be 
unsuitable for most of the perpetrators of the atrocities in northern 
Uganda because the vast majority of the reporters were abducted into 
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the LRA as children and carried out atrocities under duress.393 Deter-
rence has a very limited role to play because most of the perpetrators 
would not have voluntarily joined the LRA or committed atrocities.394 
Thus, criminal justice is inappropriate given the identity of the perpe-
trators and the circumstances surrounding their crimes.395 Additionally, 
because victims and perpetrators often belong to the same families or 
neighborhoods, finding credible evidence against perpetrators may be 
difficult.396 
 Finally, the cultural norms of the victims contribute to the inap-
propriateness of mass prosecutions. Widespread use of retributive jus-
tice would conflict with Acholi traditions and with the current perspec-
tive of the population in northern Uganda.397 The Acholis’ traditional 
mechanisms are geared towards reconciliation and reintegration rather 
than punishment.398 Interviews conducted by various NGOs note that 
many interviewees wished to forgive the perpetrators for the sake of 
peace after so many years of conflict.399 Also, according to a survey 
conducted by the International Center for Transitional Justice, fifty-
eight percent of respondents did not want low ranking members of the 
LRA to be held accountable for their crimes.400 Sixty-six percent of re-
spondents who thought LRA leaders should be held accountable sup-
ported processes such as trial and imprisonment.401 Given how ill-suited 
mass criminal justice would be in this context, the ICC could play an 
important, but limited, role in achieving justice by prosecuting the LRA 
leaders.402 
 The ICC has the potential to play an important role in national, as 
well as regional, justice, though President Museveni’s recent shift in 
attitude towards the ICC does seriously threaten the Court’s efficacy.403 
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In light of the historic mistrust between Uganda’s north and south, 
credible international trials could function as a depoliticized venue for 
justice, if and when the indicted commanders are arrested.404 As in Si-
erra Leone, prosecution by an international body could help to prevent 
the political instability that could result from national prosecutions.405 
The ICC’s prosecutions could also help to promote regional peace by 
ensuring that the Amnesty Act does not amount to total impunity.406 
Through its referral to the ICC, Uganda essentially withdrew its offer of 
amnesty to the top leadership of the LRA.407 While prosecution of the 
lower ranking former LRA rebels would not be appropriate or possible, 
trials for the leaders might signify some degree of accountability and 
justice, however limited. Despite the very small number of prosecu-
tions, the trials could nonetheless be significant if those most responsi-
ble for the atrocities are held accountable.408 
 Also, after a somewhat rocky start to its investigations, the ICC has 
subsequently made significant efforts to explain its mission to northern 
Ugandan communities, which have been concerned about the implica-
tions of the ICC process and their right to continue using traditional 
reconciliation procedures.409 Initially some Acholis reportedly per-
ceived the ICC referral as an anti-Acholi policy aimed at foiling peace 
negotiations and prolonging the war in order to keep northern 
Uganda weak.410 Others viewed the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor as 
biased and acting on behalf of President Museveni, who referred the 
situation to the ICC in December 2003.411 Because of increased contact 
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between Acholi leaders and ICC officials, a spirit of cooperation in 
northern Uganda has reportedly replaced suspicions about the Court’s 
intentions.412 Within this context of cooperation, Uganda’s decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction to the ICC could allow the ICC to function as an 
instrument for achieving justice and full closure of the conflict.413 
 An important caveat to the above analysis stems from President 
Museveni’s change of position regarding the ICC indictments.414 He 
has publicly stated that if the LRA reaches a peace agreement with the 
Ugandan government, then the government will grant Kony and the 
other indicted commanders total amnesty and seek to persuade the 
ICC to drop the indictments against them.415 In accordance with Arti-
cle 53 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has the discretion to end 
prosecutions that are not in the “interests of justice.”416 Under these 
circumstances, however, it is highly unlikely that the Prosecutor will 
drop the charges because justice requires some form of accountability, 
and President Museveni has promised to grant the LRA leaders am-
nesty, which would ensure that they would not face any sort of criminal 
prosecution.417 Unfortunately, because of President Museveni’s use of 
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the ICC indictments as a bargaining chip in the government’s peace 
negotiations with the LRA, the indictments have become a complicat-
ing factor in the peace talks.418 Consequently, the threat of ICC prose-
cutions may be exacerbating, rather than diminishing, northern 
Uganda’s instability. 
Conclusion 
 This article examines the weaknesses of Uganda’s current Amnesty 
Act and traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms. With only 
the Amnesty Act and the traditional Acholi ceremonies in place, north-
ern Uganda’s transition to peace may be hindered by Uganda’s failure 
to adequately address the interests of victims. While the path to recon-
ciliation in Uganda will be difficult and uncertain, the experiences of 
other African countries like Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Rwanda 
offer useful examples upon which Uganda may draw. Rwanda’s gacaca 
tribunals offer guidance as to how Uganda could combine the use of its 
traditional practices with the pursuit of reconciliation and community 
participation. Uganda could promote compensation as well as dialogue 
through traditional Acholi mechanisms, while at the same time main-
taining the integrity of those traditional customs. Alternatively, should 
Uganda formally establish a truth-telling process, it could look to the 
TRC of Sierra Leone as an example of how another African country 
promoted dialogue and forgiveness in the context of ongoing criminal 
prosecutions. Although the circumstances of Sierra Leone’s civil war, 
Rwanda’s genocide, and South Africa’s apartheid regime differ greatly 
from northern Uganda’s conflict with the LRA, the innovative legal ap-
proaches of Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Rwanda serve as useful 
examples and inspiration for Uganda. 
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